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Abstract 
Mindwandering (MW) is associated with both positive and negative outcomes. Among 
the latter, negative mood and negative cognitions have been reported. However, the 
underlying mechanisms linking mindwandering to negative mood and cognition are still 
unclear. We hypothesized that MW could either directly enhance negative thinking or 
indirectly heighten the accessibility of negative thoughts. In an undergraduate sample (n = 79) 
we measured emotional thoughts during the Sustained Attention on Response Task (SART) 
which induces MW, and accessibility of negative cognitions by means of the Scrambled 
Sentences Task (SST) after the task. We also measured depressive symptoms and rumination. 
Results show that in individuals with elevated levels of depressive symptoms MW during 
SART predicts higher accessibility of negative thoughts after the task, rather than negative 
thinking during the task. These findings contribute to our understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms of MW and provide insight into the relationship between task-involvement and 
affect. 
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“The mind wanders, not just away from where we aim it, but also toward what we forbid it to 
explore” 
- Daniel M. Wegner (1997, p.304) 
1. Introduction 
A typical feature of the human mind is its tendency to spontaneously generate 
thoughts and to freely wander despite the external environment (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). With the exception of several early studies (e.g. Antrobus, 1968; Singer, 1966), this 
phenomenon has only recently been systematically investigated (see Gruberger, Ben-Simon, 
Lvkovitz, Zangen, & Hendler, 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Because of the elusive 
nature of the wandering mind, several terms for this construct have been used, such as 
“mindwandering” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), “stimulus independent thought” (Mason et 
al., 2007), “daydreaming” (Mar, Mason, & Litvack, 2012; Singer, 1966), and “task unrelated 
thought” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Despite subtle conceptual differences (Christoff, 
2012), a core characteristic is a state of decoupled attention when the mind wanders, where 
attention is detached from external toward internal processing (e.g. personal goals and current 
concerns) (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Here, we adopt the umbrella term of 
mindwandering (hereafter MW) to define this phenomenon. 
MW is considered a ubiquitous phenomenon with high intra-individual stability across 
short and long time periods (Giambra, 1995; Kane et al., 2007). Recently, Killingsworth and 
Gilbert (2010) showed, using an experience sampling approach, that MW occurs during 
almost every activity in everyday life. Moreover, Kane et al. (2007) estimated that we spend 
between 10% and 30% of our daily live experiencing MW. In light of such pervasive 
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occurrence, it has been suggested that MW has several advantageous functions (Baars, 2010). 
For example, future planning is considered to be one of the most beneficial outcomes of MW 
(Schooler et al., 2011). Smallwood, Nind and O'Connor (2009) reported that MW involved 
thinking about the future, rather than about the present or past. Moreover, such future-oriented 
thought is enhanced by self-reflection (Smallwood et al., 2011) and by priming of personal 
goals (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D'Argembeau, 2011), while it is 
reduced by negative mood (Smallwood & O'Connor, 2011). The clear advantage of MW here 
is to predict possible future events, to achieve better adaptation to the environment, and 
proactively reduce upcoming distress (Bar, 2009). In keeping with this, MW may also 
facilitate personally relevant problem solving by manipulating semantic information acquired 
during external processing (Binder et al., 1999). In other words, during MW it is possible to 
systemize information which could not be organized and analyzed during stimulus 
presentation. Finally, creativity (Sio & Ormerod, 2009) and coping (Greenwald & Harder, 
1995) have also been linked to MW.  
Nevertheless, MW comes also with several downsides which should be taken into 
account. First, according to the definition of a state of decoupled attention from external 
stimulation (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), MW is consistently associated with impaired 
performance when one is required to accomplish a demanding task (Schooler et al., 2011). For 
instance, MW leads to reduced reading comprehension (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 
2008) and attentional failures (Christoff et al., 2009). Interestingly, a recent ERP study 
demonstrated that during off-task periods both task-related information as well as novel 
distractors are elaborated to a lesser extent (Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011). This 
supports the notion that during MW, attention is not drawn by external interfering stimuli but 
is actually turned inwards. Moreover, MW is often associated with reduced executive control 
(Schooler et al., 2011), reflecting either a phenomenon demanding executive resources 
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(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) or an executive failure (McVay & Kane, 2010). Second, MW 
is associated with detrimental effects on mood. A recent experience sampling study in 2250 
healthy people showed that MW at initial sampling predicted lower mood at subsequent 
sampling (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). However, it is not clear whether this happened by 
reducing positive mood, enhancing negative mood, or both. In turn, negative mood induction 
heightens MW levels (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). The latter data 
suggest a reciprocal influence between MW and mood fluctuations. Third, some evidence 
supports a specific link between MW and depressive cognitions. In their seminal study, 
Golding and Singer (1983) reported that MW substantially explained variance in depressive 
attitudes, namely self-criticism, dependency, and inefficacy. In line with this, clinically and 
subclinically depressed samples show higher levels of MW (Smallwood, O'Connor, Sudbery, 
& Obonsawin, 2007; Watts, MacLeod, & Morris, 1988). Fourth, at the level of individual 
differences, depressive symptoms as well as rumination are worth mentioning. Individual 
levels of depressive symptoms have been reported to be consistently associated with MW 
(Smallwood et al., 2003, Study 2, 3) and capable of predicting off-task thinking during a task 
(Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2006). Whereas, rumination, defined as “behaviors and 
thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of 
those symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569), has generally been reported not to predict 
MW (Smallwood et al., 2003, 2006). Although rumination has been associated theoretically 
with MW as another form of repetitive thinking (Watkins, 2008), rumination induction 
compared to distraction did not lead dysphorics to experience increased levels of MW 
(Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Keri Zehm, 2003).  
So far no studies have explicitly investigated the link between MW and negative 
cognition. Indeed, most of the available data is correlational where it is difficult to make a 
directional inference. Interestingly, a specific link between MW and negative thinking can be 
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proposed. As MW is associated with internally-oriented focus (Baird, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2011; Barron et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2011), it can heighten self-focus, which 
has been reliably associated with negative mood (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Moreover, a 
consistent line of research stressed that during spontaneous thought personal priorities and 
goals are actively processed (Giambra 1995; Levinson, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; 
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010), so that personal concerns may emerge and impact on 
thinking.      
In keeping with this, MW can potentially have either direct or indirect effects on 
cognition that may explain its mood dampening effects. That is, it could be that when people’s 
minds wander they are inclined to think in a self-critical and negative way, with MW being 
directly associated with increased negative cognitions. Alternatively, MW can also have an 
indirect effect on negative cognitions through other cognitive mechanisms such as self-
focused attention. In this case there would be an increased accessibility of negative 
cognitions, without an immediate detrimental effect on thinking. To our best knowledge, these 
after-effects on cognitions have never been investigated.  
In the current experiment, MW, operationalized as “a shift of attention away from a 
primary task toward internal information” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, p. 946), was 
induced and measured using a slow-paced Go/NoGo paradigm, the Sustained Attention on 
Response Task (SART, Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). The 
execution of the task was pseudo-randomly interleaved by thought probes to determine the 
presence of mindwandering (MW, from being completely on-task to completely off-task) and 
the valence of cognitions (from negative to positive) during the task, the latter allowing to test 
the direct effect of MW on cognition. Previous research has extensively shown that SART 
performance is related to attentional failures in everyday life (ecological validity; Smilek, 
Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010) and induces MW (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Alternatively to 
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literature which conceptualizes MW as a categorical phenomenon (Christoff et al., 2009), we 
adopted a dimensional approach for two reasons. First, capitalizing on the variance at the 
level of each thought probe by using a Likert scale can provide substantially more 
information. Second, previous studies found that the neurobiological substrate of MW, 
namely the Default Mode Network (Gruberger et al., 2011), parametrically interferes with 
being completely engaged in a task rather than in an “all-or-none” fashion (i.e., Weissman, 
Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006). Consistent with our new approach, recently Prado and 
Weissman (2011, pp.2281) claimed that: “[…] in addition to theorizing about discrete on- 
and off-task states (Smallwood et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009), it may be fruitful to 
conceptualize default-mode interference along a continuum”. For these reasons, we decide to 
adopt a continuous measure rather than a categorical approach.  
To examine the indirect effect of MW, we examined the accessibility of negative 
thoughts using a Scrambled Sentences Task (SST, Van der Does, 2005; Wenzlaff & Bates, 
1998) before and after MW. This task requires participants to unscramble sentences to form 
grammatically correct and meaningful statements using five of six displayed words. By 
reporting the unscrambled sentence that first comes to mind, every sentence is resolved in 
either a positive or negative manner. In depression-related research, this task has been used 
extensively and found to be sensitive to fluctuations in the accessibility of negative cognitions 
(Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Unlike the standard 
paradigm, we did not tax participants’ executive resources by means of cognitive load (i.e. 
retaining a six digit number), because we expected that MW would impair mental resources 
necessary to regulate negative thinking (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Finally, depressive 
symptoms and ruminative thinking were both considered in the analysis in order to investigate 
the potential effect of individual differences in predicting negative cognitions.  
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
Eighty undergraduates from Ghent University participated in this study for course credits. 
One case constituting an outlier (standardized residuals > 3) was dropped, as recommended 
by Meyers, Gamst, and Guarino (2006), leaving 79 individuals (mean age = 20.3 years, SD = 
2.6, 75.9% female). All participants signed informed consent. The study was approved by the 
Ethical Committee at Ghent University.  
2.2. Materials  
Questionnaires. Individual differences in subclinical depressive symptoms and thinking style 
were considered in this study. Dysphoria and rumination were assessed respectively by the 
Beck Depression Inventory – 2nd Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and 
Ruminative Response Scale - Revised (RRS-R; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). As 
measure of current mood state, we used the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS, 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Scrambled Sentences Test (SST). The SST is a paper-and-pencil test which evaluates the 
activation of negative relative to positive cognitions and includes 3 sets of 20 scrambled 
sentences (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Each scrambled sentence comprises of six words 
randomly ordered in an ungrammatical form. Five of the six words from each sentence must 
be chosen and ordered to form one of two possible sentences. One sentence has a positive 
outcome and the other has a negative resolution. Participants had to complete each set within 
2.5 minutes. All participants completed one sentence set before and one sentence set after the 
mindwandering phase, and the order of the sets was fully counterbalanced. The main outcome 
is the ratio of negative sentences to all the total grammatically correct sentences. Although the 
SST cannot compute statistically independent indexes for negative and positive cognitions, 
the vast majority of the literature relies on the SST to measure negative cognitions (Phillips et 
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al., 2010). Thus, in relation to the SST we hereafter refer to “negative cognitions”, though 
being aware of the limitations above mentioned. A validated Dutch version of the SST was 
used (Van der Does, 2005). 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART). The SART is a Go/No-Go paradigm explicitly 
aimed to facilitate mindwandering or off-task thought (Robertson et al., 1997; Christoff et al., 
2009). Two different kinds of stimuli appeared on the screen. Participants had to respond 
(pressing a button) to a non-target (e.g. letter “O” – Go stimulus) and withhold the response 
(not pressing) to a target (e.g. letter “Q” – NoGo stimulus). The SART session consisted of 40 
targets (5.5%) and 720 non-targets. Stimulus presentation time and interstimulus interval were 
both 1250ms. This rate of stimulus presentation was based on previous studies indicating that 
slow stimulus presentation rate yields greater off-task thought (Jackson & Balota, 2012; 
Smallwood et al., 2004). Moreover, pseudo-randomly 40 probes consisting of two questions 
were presented. Participants had to report if either the thought preceding the probe was fully 
focused on the task or they were experiencing mindwandering (MW), and then to rate the 
valence of these thoughts (Valence of the Cognitions). Both questions were answered on a 7-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = on-task to 7 = off-task for the first, and from 1 = 
extremely negative to 7 = extremely positive for the second probe. The whole task lasted 
about 35 minutes. 
2.3. Design 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were required to fill in current mood state 
measures (PANAS T1), followed by a measure of the accessibility of negative cognitions 
(SST T1). Then, individuals underwent the MW phase (SART), after which changes in the 
accessibility of negative cognitions were assessed again (SST T2). Finally, mood state 
measures (PANAS T2) and individual differences scales (BDI-II and RRS-R) were 
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administered. Except for specific characteristics, such design mirrors other studies 
investigating the impact of MW on self-referential thinking (Smallwood et al., 2011, Study 2).   
2.4. Data-analytic strategy 
We first checked the efficacy of our manipulation in inducing MW in participants (MW 
thought probes and commission errors). To ascertain the effect of time on the distribution of 
commission errors and responses to the thought probes, we obtained two halves from the 
SART, both consisting of the same amount of (non-)targets and thought probes (Stawarczyk 
et al., 2011). We then performed a paired Student’s t-test between the first and second half 
both for MW thought probes and commission errors.  
After this manipulation check, we evaluated changes in affect and affective cognitions 
during the experiment. We first analyzed mood changes (PANAS scales) before and after the 
SART by means of 2x2 ANOVA (Time and Valence as within-subject factors). Then, we 
conducted a paired Student’s t-test to investigate whether cognitions became more negative 
(second thought probe) in the second half compared with the first of the SART. We also 
investigated, by means of a paired Student’s t-test, whether there was a change in the 
accessibility of negative cognitions before and after the SART.  
Finally, we ran two multiple linear regression models1 aiming to investigate whether (i) 
MW and individual differences could explain the valence of cognitions during the SART 
(direct effect), after controlling for mood changes; (ii) MW and individual differences (BDI-II 
and RRS-R) could predict the increase of negative cognitions (SST) after SART (indirect 
effect), after controlling for mood changes. We also incorporated into the models the 
interactions between significant predictors. To do so, we used the Hayes and Matthes’ (2009) 
MODPROBE computational procedures for probing interactions. The MODPROBE macro 
produces the usual regression output as well as estimates of the effect of the focal predictor 
variables at values of the moderator variable (for details, see Hayes & Matthes, 2009). 
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According to Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), the predictor variables are mean-
centered prior calculating the interaction term. To visualize statistically significant 
interactions the MODPROBE provides the conditional effects of or simple slopes for the focal 
predictor at low (one SD below the mean), moderate (sample mean), and high (one SD above 
the mean) values of the moderator, resulting in three groups of participants. 
 
3. Results 
Descriptive statistics and means are provided in Table 1. 
3.1. Mindwandering: manipulation check  
To ascertain the efficacy of our manipulation, we conducted two paired Student’s t-tests 
between the first and second half of the SART. First, concerning the MW probes, analysis 
revealed a significant increase of MW, t(78) = 4.95, p < .001, d = .55, with individuals’ 
thoughts being more off-task in the second half (M = 4.64, SD = 1.21) than in the first (M = 
4.09, SD = 0.94). Moreover, the number of commission errors was significantly different 
across time, t(78) = 4.46, p < .001, d = .50, with the second half being characterized by more 
errors (M = 8.16, SD = 4.00) than the first (M = 6.21, SD = 3.86). These results confirmed the 
efficacy of the experimental manipulation, in that being off-task and committing errors 
increased with time, whereas being fully on-task decreased. 
3.2. Overall Mood State Changes 
To investigate mood changes, a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was run on PANAS, with 
Time (pre vs. post) and Valence (positive vs. negative) as within-subject factors. The analyses 
revealed main effects of Time, F(1, 78) = 81.68, p < .001, η2p = .51, and Valence, F(1, 78) = 
311.36, p < .001, η2p = .80. Also a significant Time x Valence interaction was found, F(1, 78) 
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= 49.71, p < .001, η2p = .39, qualified by a significant reduction of positive mood, t(78) = 
9.45, p < .001, d  = 1.05, whereas no significant change in negative mood was detected, t(78) 
= 0.60, p = ns., d = 0.07. 
3.3. Overall Changes in Affective Cognitions 
To assess negative cognitions during SART, analyses were performed on two halves of 
paradigm. A paired Student’s t-test was performed on the Valence of Cognitions probe, 
reporting a significant difference across two SART parts, t(78) = 3.14, p < .002, d = 0.35, with 
cognitions being more negative/less positive in the second half  (M = 3.74, SD = 0.79) than in 
the first half (M = 3.97, SD = 0.57). To assess the accessibility of negative cognitions after 
MW, a paired Student’s t-test was run on the SST negative index (percentage of the ratio 
between negatively interpreted scenarios and total number of scenarios) before and after 
SART paradigm. The analysis revealed a significantly increased accessibility of negative 
cognitions after the MW-related phase, t(78) = 3.11, p < .01, d = 0.35. 
3.4. Does mindwandering predict increased negative cognitions (direct effect)? 
The possible direct effect of MW in enhancing negative cognitions was explored by 
adopting a regression approach (for zero-order correlations, see Table 2). The mean Valence 
of Cognitions served as dependent variable, while individual differences (BDI-II and RRS-R) 
and changes in negative and positive mood (Δ PANAS T2-T1) were entered as predictors in 
the first step. In the second step, the mean MW probe scores served as predictor2. Variance-
inflation-factors were all around 1, showing that multicollinearity was not a problem. 
Analyses revealed that the enhanced level of negative cognitions during MW was not 
significantly predicted  by the model, nor by single predictors (see Table 3).  
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3.5. Does mindwandering predict enhanced accessibility of negative cognitions (indirect 
effect)? 
To explore the relation between MW, changes in mood, and accessibility of negative 
cognitions, we ran a hierarchical regression to investigate whether the magnitude of MW 
predicts enhanced accessibility of negative cognitions (see Table 4; for zero order-
correlations, see Table 2). The increase of SST negative index after MW (post minus pre 
measure of the ratio between negatively interpreted scenarios and total number of scenarios; Δ 
SST Negative Index T2-T1) served as dependent variable. In the first step, individual 
differences measures (BDI-II and RRS-R) as well as changes in positive and negative mood 
(Δ PANAS T2-T1) after MW were entered. Then, in the second step, the mean MW thought 
probe scores were entered3, while in the third step, the interaction between MW thought probe 
and BDI-II was entered. Variance-inflation-factors were all around 1, indicating that 
multicollinearity was not a problem.  
Importantly, the analysis evidenced a significant interaction between MW thought probe 
and depressive symptoms (Step 3) with respect to the increase accessibility of negative 
cognitions (b = .01, t(72) = 2.42, p < .02). This interaction is represented in Fig. 1. The 
strength of positive relation between being off-task (MW) and increased accessibility of 
negative cognitions (Δ SST Negative Index T2-T1) was stronger among those participants 
with high levels (above 1 SD) of depressive symptoms (b = .08, SE b = .02, t(72) = 3.90, p < 
.001, 95% CI = .04; .12) than in individuals with a moderate level (mean) of depressive 
symptoms (b = .04, SE b = .01, t(72) = 2.68, p < .01, 95% CI = .02; .07). Such relation was 
absent in participants with low levels (below 1 SD) of depressive symptoms (b = .001, SE b = 
.02, t(72) = .02, p = ns., 95% CI = -.04; .05). It should be noted that, given the presence of a 
significant interaction, MW and depressive symptoms (BDI-II) cannot be interpreted as main 
effects because these are conditional effects (Cohen et al., 2003; Hayes & Matthes, 2009).  
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4. Discussion 
Research has shown that we spend a great part of our mental life experiencing MW 
(Kane et al., 2007; Singer, 1966). Interestingly, higher levels of MW are associated with 
lower mood (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and negative thinking (Golding & Singer, 1983; 
Smallwood et al., 2007). We sought to examine the association between MW and negative 
cognitions, distinguishing between possible direct and indirect effects. To do so, we measured 
both negative cognitions during a MW-related paradigm and accessibility of negative thinking 
afterwards. 
In our study, MW predicted heightened accessibility of negative cognition afterwards 
(indirect effect), but only in those with moderate (mean) or high levels (1 SD above the mean) 
of depression. Interestingly, such toxic impact of MW did not emerge in individuals with low 
levels (1 SD below the mean) of depressive symptoms. On the contrary, neither MW nor the 
level of depressive symptoms had immediate effects on negative cognition (direct effect). 
Interestingly, none of these effects was due to mood changes. These findings are important in 
understanding the mechanisms through which MW is associated with lower mood and 
negative cognition in daily life (Golding & Singer, 1983; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Mar 
et al., 2012) and bear interesting implications for our understanding of such associations. 
Several non-mutual exclusive explanations can be proposed for these results. 
Recent perspectives claim that during MW (i) attention is mainly focused internally 
(Baird et al., 2011; Barron et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2011) and (ii) personal 
goals/priorities are actively processed (Levinson et al., 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). On the 
one hand, internal focus may enhance access to self-focus and self-immersed thinking about 
one’s future or past, which have both been shown to elicit negative thoughts (Kross, Ayduk, 
& Mischel, 2005; Mor & Winquist, 2002). On the other hand, the fact that MW negatively 
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impacted on cognitions only in people with significant levels of depression provides 
preliminary support for a role of personal concerns. Indeed, research has shown that dysphoria 
is characterized by an elevated level of current concerns (Ruehlman, 1985; Salmela-Aro & 
Nurmi, 1996).  
In light of our results, some broader implications can be derived with regard to the 
impact of MW on mental life. Consistent with the literature, it seems that MW is not a 
negative phenomenon per se. MW indeed did not impact on thinking directly during off-task 
thoughts. Moreover, although MW enhanced subsequent accessibility of negative thinking, 
we have been able to clarify specific conditions in which this detrimental effect occurred. In 
our study, both elevated levels of depression and being exposed to ambiguous stimuli which 
can be negatively framed (SST) were necessary to detect the negative effect of MW. We also 
replicated previous findings showing that rumination is not related with MW (Smallwood et 
al., 2003, 2006).   
Our findings might also be interpreted from a different point of view. That is, the 
presented results indicate that being fully engaged into a task helps to prevent negative 
thoughts and promote positive cognitions in individuals with significant levels of depression. 
This alternative interpretation can be explained in light of theories of mood and well-being, 
where it is often believed that being concentrated in a task and mindfully attentive to the 
present moment has positive effects on mood and well-being (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 
1982; Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011). Moreover, several therapeutic interventions have 
dysphoric and depressed individuals fully engage in tasks in everyday life in order to distract 
them from the typical depressive repetitive thinking (Duckworth, Steen, & Seligman, 2005; 
Hopko, Lejuez, Ruggier, & Eifert, 2003). In keeping with this, the present data indicate that 
the ability to remain on-task indeed helps to prevent negative thoughts and promote positive 
cognitions in at-risk individuals.  
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This study has several limitations. Obviously, it remains to be seen whether these 
findings in the lab generalize to more naturalistic settings, even if the SART has a good 
ecological validity (Smilek et al, 2010). Moreover, in our study the amount of commission 
errors were related neither with the level of MW nor with the other variables implicated in 
explaining the increase of negative cognitions. Despite the fact the commission errors during 
SART have been generally reported to be associated with a more direct measure of MW 
(amount of off-task thoughts; Hu, He, & Xu, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009), alternative indices 
of MW during the SART (e.g., RTs) have been proposed as well. It is worth mentioning that 
sometimes subjective and behavioral markers of MW appeared to be independent while 
preceding behavioral (e.g. RTs) and neural activity resulted to be correlated  (Smallwood et 
al., 2004, 2008). Such data suggests that both MW-related self-reports and commission errors 
can be considered  markers of MW, with there being a need to further understand when which 
measures are optimal (Smallwood et al., 2008). In keeping with this limitation, it could be that 
our definition and operationalization of MW is related to different kinds of undirected 
thought, even though in real life most of these phenomena tend to overlap (Christoff, 2012). 
Finally, the procedure we chose to measure the accessibility of negative cognitions (SST) 
cannot provide orthogonal scores for negative and positive cognitions in that the ratio between 
both cognitions is mostly used. Thus, it is unclear whether an increased negative ratio 
indicates enhanced accessibility of negative thoughts or reduced accessibility of positive 
thoughts. However, it is noteworthy that previous literature adopted the SST as a measure of 
negative cognitions (Phillips et al., 2010).    
In sum, the past years have witnessed increased research interest in examining mental 
operations of individuals whose attention is decoupled from the surrounding environment 
(Gruberger et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). The present findings indicate that 
there is a reciprocal relation between MW and negative cognitions as previous data suggested 
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(Golding & Singer, 1983; Smallwood et al., 2006, 2007). We now observe that MW shows 
specificity in heightening accessibility to negative cognitions, and that such relation is 
mediated by the individual level of depression. As we spend so much time wandering off even 
when we are required to be engaged, understanding the underlying mechanisms and possible 
affective consequences of MW may provide important clues about what happens during a 
substantial part of our daily life. 
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Footnotes 
1 The same results reported below were obtained, without dropping the outlying case, by 
means of robust regression (M-estimation with Hubber weighting). 
 
2 The amount of commission errors was not included in the analysis since this variable was 
correlated neither with the dependent variable nor with other predictors. 
 
3 Similar results were obtained by adopting a categorical approach. In this case MW probe 
responses were dichotomized by classifying scores between 1 and 3 as “on-task thought” and 
scores between 5 and 7 as “off-task thought”. Responses scored in the midpoint were 
excluded (Christoff et al., 2009). Both reduction of on-task thoughts and increase of off-task 
thoughts emerged as significant predictors for the “indirect effect” on negative cognitions. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Effect of the MW on the predicted increase of accessibility of negative cognitions 
(Δ SST Negative Index T2-T1) at low (below 1 SD), moderate (mean) and high 
(above 1 SD) levels of depressive symptoms (all the predictors variables were 
centered prior the analysis).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the measures used in the study (n = 79) 
Task and measure Mean SD Range (min. – max) 
Questionnaire – Individual Differences    
   BDI-II 8.91 5.95 0 – 28 
   RRS-R 51.97 13.28 5 – 90 
Questionnaire – Mood State    
   PANAS positive T1 30.63 5.44 18 – 42 
   PANAS negative T1 14.31 4.47 10 – 31 
   PANAS positive T2 24.86 6.46 10 – 41 
   PANAS negative T2 14.56 3.75 10 – 27 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART)    
   Mindwandering 4.37 0.97 1.60 – 6.15 
   Valence of the Cognitions  3.84 0.62 1.88 – 5.33 
   Commission errors 14.37 6.83 2 – 32 
Scrambled Sentences Test (SST)    
   SST Negative Index T1 (%) 15.95 17.16 0 – 66.67 
   SST Negative Index T2 (%) 21.16 21.04 0 – 94.74 
Note: Higher scores at the Mindwandering probe of the SART indicate more off-task focus, while lower scores represent 
more on-task focus. Higher scores at the Valence of the Cognitions probe of the SART indicate more cognitive positivity 
during the task, while lower scores represent more negative cognitions. Commission Errors indicate the number of failures in 
withholding behavior in response to “Q” targets. The Negative Index of the SST paradigm was calculated as the percentage 
of the ratio between the number of negatively unscrambled sentences and all the unscrambled sentences. Only grammatically 
correct sentences were included and percentages before (T1) and after (T2) SART paradigm are reported. 
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Table 3. Summary regression statistics in predicting enhanced negative cognitions during 
mindwandering (direct effect)  
Valence of the 
Cognitions 
Step Predictor B SE B sr β 
 1 BDI-II -.01 .01 -.11 -.117 
  RRS-R .00 .00 .05 .058 
  Δ PANAS positive T2-T1  .02 .01 .16 .176 
  Δ PANAS negative T2-T1 -.03 .02 -.16 -.173 
 2 BDI-II -.01 .01 -.12 -.138 
  RRS-R .00 .00 .05 .064 
  Δ PANAS positive T2-T1  .02 .01 .17 .186 
  Δ PANAS negative T2-T1 -.03 .02 -.15 -.163 
  MW -.08 .07 -.12 -.127 
For the negative cognitions R2 = .085 for Step 1, ns; ΔR2 = .016 for Step 2, ns. Note: sr = semipartial correlation.  Valence 
of the Cognitions = thought probe measuring the valence of the cognitions during SART paradigm. Higher scores 
represent cognitions more positively than negatively valenced.  Δ PANAS positive T2-T1 and Δ PANAS negative T2-T1 = 
differential score between second and first PANAS, respectively either positive or negative. Higher scores represent an 
increase either of positive or negative mood at time 2, controlling for time 1. Higher scores at the MW probe of the SART 
indicate more off-task focus, while lower scores represent more on-task focus.  
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Table 4. Summary regression statistics in predicting enhanced accessibility of negative cognitions 
after mindwandering (indirect effect)  
Δ SST Negative 
Index T2-T1 
Step Predictor B SE B sr β 
 1 BDI-II .01 .00 .28 .304** 
  RRS-R .00 .00 .05 .064 
  Δ PANAS positive T2-T1  -.01 .00 -.06 -.073 
  Δ PANAS negative T2-T1 .01 .00 .16 .176 
 2 BDI-II .01 .00 .32 .355*** 
  RRS-R .00 .00 .04 .048 
  Δ PANAS positive T2-T1  -.01 .00 -.09 -.097 
  Δ PANAS negative T2-T1 .01 .00 .14 .150 
  MW .05 .02 .30 .307** 
 3 BDI-II .01 .00 .33 .370*** 
  RRS-R .00 .00 -.02 -.024 
  Δ PANAS positive T2-T1  .00 .00 -.06 -.067 
  Δ PANAS negative T2-T1 .01 .00 .11 .123 
  MW .04 .02 .16 .270** 
  MW x BDI-II .01 .00 .14 .259* 
* p < .05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 . For the increase of negative cognitions R2 = .164 for Step 1, p < .01; ΔR2 = .091 for Step 
2, p < .005; ΔR2 = .056 for Step 3, p < .02. Note: sr = semipartial correlation. Δ SST Negative Index T2-T1 = differential 
score between SST negative indexes after (T2) and before (T1) SART paradigm. Higher scores represent an increase of 
negative cognitions at time 2, controlling for time 1.  Δ PANAS positive T2-T1 and Δ PANAS negative T2-T1 = differential 
score between PANAS, respectively either positive or negative, after (T2) and before (T1) SART paradigm. Higher scores 
represent an increase either of positive or negative mood at time 2, controlling for time 1. Higher scores at the MW probe 
of the SART indicate more off-task focus, while lower scores represent more on-task focus. MW x BDI-II = interaction 
between off-task thought and depressive symptoms (both variables were mean-centered prior calculating the product). 
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